Showing posts with label epistemology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label epistemology. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
Foucault, Les mots et les choses
I just finished This book, possibly the last of Foucault's that I haven't yet read. He is resting his entire analysis of semiotics on the notice that, at the end of the XVIIIth century, the fields of knowledge that required synthesis became separate from the fields of knowledge that required analysis. In other words, social sciences became separate from the exact sciences. I have two comments about that. First, this is only one phase of a much broader phenomenon of the rise of scientism which has been chronicled and discussed at length by other French philosophers before Foucault. Second, I also noticed an epistemic revolution with the Aristotlelian revival about a century earlier, the consequences of which we are still experiencing.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason
Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason is a controversial book. It is of course very bold to parallel Kant's most famous work's title, Critique of Pure Reason. The two or three chapters argue philosophically against the dialectic of enlightenment, and then the book moves into a historical description of iconoclasts. It has a long cultural discussion of the Weimar Republic, then the Nazi regime. One could read into this a condemnation of political correctness, which no doubt is the reason for the book's controversy.
Wednesday, January 2, 2008
Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations and Realism and the Aim of Science
Realism is part of three books as postscripts to Logic of Scientific Inquiry, which is an excellent book but which I read about ten years ago. So it's harder to follow, although it's very good. I certainly understand better the necessity to settle the issue of whether the world can be mapped by theory, and of course I was reminded of Popper's great contribution to knowledge, the criteria of falsifiability. Conjectures is also an excellent book, which has on p. 37 the quote: "...the criterion of the scientific statement of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.' This answers a question I had in my mind for many years, since a reviewer asked whether the theory of strategy I originated was falsifiable -- possibly there were flaws in the formulation regarding falsifiability, but it is now clear to me that it was testable. And I have, repeatedly, tested it. On p. 221 of m y edition (New York: Basic, 1962), he discusses the current ideal of science, which is an atomatized deductive system. This ideal has been dominant in European epistemology since Euclid through Newton and, of course Einstein. There has been a consistent tension between the intuitionist inductivist Continent and the North American atomized deductivist. I can live with deduction. I as a thinker cannot live with atomization. Strategy is impossible with atomization, and so are most complex social and/or intellectual phenomena.In Conjecture and Refutations (New York: Rowman Littlefield, 1983), Popper says that 'The inductivist's mistake is not confined to his failure to appreciate the difference between learning by trial and error and learning by rote, or to his consequent assumption that we can add to our knowledge by the formation of habits. He also believes that there is some raw material for knowledge in the form of perceptions or observations or sense-impressions..." Well, I do believe it. I believe the scientific method, like the legal system, passes on nine-tenths of what is know and true.
Labels:
atomization,
deductivism,
epistemology,
inductivism,
Popper
Karl Popper's Open Society and Objective Knowledge
I have been an admirer of Karl Popper, but with Objective Knowledge I understood more fully what he was interested in debating and I found my increase in understanding meant I was less interested. Ultimately, I don't think it is possible to settle the issue of whether we are bound to repeat history or, really, whether we are free or not, which are the issues underlying the discussions about inductivism and all the rest. What is striking to me in Open Society and its Enemies is the ease with which he identifies problems of incipient authoritarianism in all these philosophers in vogue. The other striking fact is that he feels free to criticize just about anybody really vigorously, and I wonder he didn't run into all sorts of trouble with his fellow academics. He savages intuition, which I value, with the following: "'intuitionist logic' is ...just a name for a very interesting and somewhat weakened form of classical logic." (p. 306). So there!
Labels:
authoritarianism,
epistemology,
Popper
Sunday, December 30, 2007
Karl Popper, Parmenides
I read Poppers ten essays on the World of Parmenides. I read Parmenides a long time ago, when I was sixteen, and I remember him as one of the hardest reads ever, right up there with Being and Nothingness, Sartre's dissertation, which I read the same summer. I also recall I taught myself Chopin's Nocturne in E Major then. Learning the piano was easy. Parmenides was hard.
There are some interesting comments about my great foe, Aristotle. "Aristotle breaks with the reasonable tradition that says we know very little. He thinks he knows a lot..." (p. 2 of my edition, Routledge 1998). Popper also cites Kirk and Raven, that 'gross departures from common sense must only be accepted when the evidence for them is extremely strong." (p. 20) I also thought his point about the continuation of the cosmology of the Greeks being the science of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton, and that our our civilization is abased upon that science. (p. 105) And finally, kind words for my sore academic's heart: "I suggest that, as philosophers, we have a very special critical task -- the task of swimming against the tide. thus we should try, in spite of our critical attitude, to help and support any neglected idea, however unpromising, and especially any new idea; for new ideas are are; and even if there is only a little truth in some of them, they may perhaps indicate an intellectual need, or perhaps some confusion within the set of ideas that we have uncritically accepted so far." (p. 147)
And in closing, back to Aristotle. "Aristotlelian logic is the theory of demonstrable knowledge, and Dante was right when he called Aristotle 'the master of all who know'. He is the founder of the proof, the apodeixis; of the apodeitic syllogism. He is a scientist in the scientistic sense and the theoretician of scientific proof and the authoritarian claims of Science. Yet Aristotle himself became the discoverer (or rather the rediscoverer of the impossibility of knowledge: of the problem of demonstrable knowledge of of the impossibility of its solution. [Impossible within the Aristotlian epistemology, sure.] For if all knowledge, all science, has to be demonstrable, then this leads us (he discovered0 to an infinite regress. This is because any proof consists of premises and conclusions, of initial statements and of concluding statements; and if the initial statements are yet to be proved, the concluding statements are also yet to be proved." (p. 276)
There are some interesting comments about my great foe, Aristotle. "Aristotle breaks with the reasonable tradition that says we know very little. He thinks he knows a lot..." (p. 2 of my edition, Routledge 1998). Popper also cites Kirk and Raven, that 'gross departures from common sense must only be accepted when the evidence for them is extremely strong." (p. 20) I also thought his point about the continuation of the cosmology of the Greeks being the science of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton, and that our our civilization is abased upon that science. (p. 105) And finally, kind words for my sore academic's heart: "I suggest that, as philosophers, we have a very special critical task -- the task of swimming against the tide. thus we should try, in spite of our critical attitude, to help and support any neglected idea, however unpromising, and especially any new idea; for new ideas are are; and even if there is only a little truth in some of them, they may perhaps indicate an intellectual need, or perhaps some confusion within the set of ideas that we have uncritically accepted so far." (p. 147)
And in closing, back to Aristotle. "Aristotlelian logic is the theory of demonstrable knowledge, and Dante was right when he called Aristotle 'the master of all who know'. He is the founder of the proof, the apodeixis; of the apodeitic syllogism. He is a scientist in the scientistic sense and the theoretician of scientific proof and the authoritarian claims of Science. Yet Aristotle himself became the discoverer (or rather the rediscoverer of the impossibility of knowledge: of the problem of demonstrable knowledge of of the impossibility of its solution. [Impossible within the Aristotlian epistemology, sure.] For if all knowledge, all science, has to be demonstrable, then this leads us (he discovered0 to an infinite regress. This is because any proof consists of premises and conclusions, of initial statements and of concluding statements; and if the initial statements are yet to be proved, the concluding statements are also yet to be proved." (p. 276)
Friday, December 28, 2007
Tea Bliss, Great Expectations, Maritain v. 3 and 4
I got a book on tea, Tea Bliss by Theresa Cheung. What I mostly learned was the vocabulary regarding the description of tea, and the idea that a tea's flavor can go flat. I immediately realized the truth of this, so much for my habit of reheating tea on occasion. Green tea goes completely flat. I also read Great Expectations, and I have to say I thought this was a masterpiece. The point of view of a young boy is marvelously rendered, and I thoroughly enjoyed it.
Maritain was an easy read for a philosopher. I continue to be amazed at the career of a Catholic philosopher, someone who studied Thomas Aquinas, in an academic setting. I continue to be surprised at the unabashed religious anthropocentrism, the naked feeling of Catholic superiority, that he constantly expresses. But of course this was all written in the 20's and 30's. I enjoyed Reflexions sur l'intelligence, which like many other books is really a collection of essays. It contains some interesting thoughts on analogical thinking, which is related to my research. For example, on page 120, he says that 'l'inadequation de la connaissance par analogie n'affecte que notre mode de connaitre, et non pas la verite de ce que nous connaissons..." The inadequacies of knowledge through analogy affects our mode of knowledge, but not the truth of what we know. Maritain makes in some of the later works some interesting connections between faith and science.I also thought it was interesting to see his discussions about Aristotle. On p. 227, "Pour lever le conflit qui mettait aux prises la Physique nouvelle et la philosophie d'Aristote, il aurait fallu des esprits d'une vigueur exceptionnelle, capables de discerner, derriere le nuage de confusions dont nous venons de parler, les lignes essentielles et la compatibilite fonciere des deux disciplines, au moment meme ou toutes deux, l'ancienne en pleine decadence et la nouvelle encore en formation, etaient le moins conscientes de leurs limites."
In v. 4, he has a charming biography of Thomas Aquinas. I knew nothing about him, although I had read some of the great Summa theologica, and so everything was a revelation, including the fact that he was controversial in his lifetime. Ah! The bishops of France have a great deal to answer for! The great essay, however, is Degres du savoir. It treats a wide range of questions -- Maritain's longer books, I am discovering, are often disjointed from one chapter to the next -- and provides a spiritual or religious basis for much of what we think of now as being purely scientific. On p. 315 of my edition, "...la loi scientifique ne fait jamais qu'exprimer la propriete ou l'exigence d'un certain indivisible ontologique qui par lui-meme ne tombe pas sous les sens (n'est pas observable) et reste pour les sciences de la nature un x (d'ailleurs indispensable), et qui n'est autre que ce que les philosophes designent sous le nom de nature ou essence." He also distinguishes between what exists and the representation of that object in the mind. I can't see how a philosophical system accommodating science can live with that distinction, as correct as it seems to be.
Maritain was an easy read for a philosopher. I continue to be amazed at the career of a Catholic philosopher, someone who studied Thomas Aquinas, in an academic setting. I continue to be surprised at the unabashed religious anthropocentrism, the naked feeling of Catholic superiority, that he constantly expresses. But of course this was all written in the 20's and 30's. I enjoyed Reflexions sur l'intelligence, which like many other books is really a collection of essays. It contains some interesting thoughts on analogical thinking, which is related to my research. For example, on page 120, he says that 'l'inadequation de la connaissance par analogie n'affecte que notre mode de connaitre, et non pas la verite de ce que nous connaissons..." The inadequacies of knowledge through analogy affects our mode of knowledge, but not the truth of what we know. Maritain makes in some of the later works some interesting connections between faith and science.I also thought it was interesting to see his discussions about Aristotle. On p. 227, "Pour lever le conflit qui mettait aux prises la Physique nouvelle et la philosophie d'Aristote, il aurait fallu des esprits d'une vigueur exceptionnelle, capables de discerner, derriere le nuage de confusions dont nous venons de parler, les lignes essentielles et la compatibilite fonciere des deux disciplines, au moment meme ou toutes deux, l'ancienne en pleine decadence et la nouvelle encore en formation, etaient le moins conscientes de leurs limites."
In v. 4, he has a charming biography of Thomas Aquinas. I knew nothing about him, although I had read some of the great Summa theologica, and so everything was a revelation, including the fact that he was controversial in his lifetime. Ah! The bishops of France have a great deal to answer for! The great essay, however, is Degres du savoir. It treats a wide range of questions -- Maritain's longer books, I am discovering, are often disjointed from one chapter to the next -- and provides a spiritual or religious basis for much of what we think of now as being purely scientific. On p. 315 of my edition, "...la loi scientifique ne fait jamais qu'exprimer la propriete ou l'exigence d'un certain indivisible ontologique qui par lui-meme ne tombe pas sous les sens (n'est pas observable) et reste pour les sciences de la nature un x (d'ailleurs indispensable), et qui n'est autre que ce que les philosophes designent sous le nom de nature ou essence." He also distinguishes between what exists and the representation of that object in the mind. I can't see how a philosophical system accommodating science can live with that distinction, as correct as it seems to be.
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