Sarraute and a truckload of strategy books

Since my last post,I spent three days straight in a library for professional reasons. So I read the complete works of Nathalie Sarraute on the way down (I'm in Washington), and then I read the following books. I thought I wasn't going to be able to do it. I did it, but now I'm really tired. Here's the list:

Albert, David S. and Daniel S. Papp. The Information Age: An Anthology on Its Impact and Consequences. Washington, D.C. : The Center for Advanced Concepts and Technologies, 1997.

Allen, Thomas B. Declassified : 50 Top-Secret Documents That Changed History. Washington: National Geographic, 2008. 305 pages.

Berger, Samuel R., Scowcroft, Brent., Nash, William L., In The Wake Of War : Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities. New York : Council on Foreign Relations, 2005.

Biddles, Stephen D. American Grand Strategy After 9/11:An Assessment. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005, 50 p.

Biddle, Stephen. Military Power : Explaining Victory And Defeat In Modern Battle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Bracey, Earnest N. The Comedy Of War : Understanding Military Policy And Politics For The Twenty-First Century. Lanham: University Press of America, 2006.

Brailey, Malcolm. The Transformation Of Special Operations Forces In Contemporary Conflict : Strategy, Missions, Organisation And Tactics. Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005.

Briscoe, Charles H. All roads lead to Baghdad : Army Special Operation Forces in Iraq. Fort Bragg: USASOC History Office, 2006. 517 p.

Buley, Benjamin. The New American Way Of War : Military Culture And The Political Utility Of Force. New York : Routledge, 2008.

C4ISR Integrated Architecture Program (CIAP), United States Central Command, Command Intelligence Strategy Document (Fourth Edition, July 1996).

C4ISR Integrated Architecture Program (CIAP), United States Central Command, Command Intelligence Strategy Document (Fifth Edition, May 1997).

Centre for Army Lessons Learned, “Targeting for Victory: Winning the Civil Military Operations / Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,” Targeting for Victory Newsletter 3-23, Sep 2003.

Cimbala, Stephen J. Through a Glass Darkly : Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management & Termination. Westport: Greenwood, 2001.

Council on Foreign Relations. Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.

Davis, Paul , Jonathan Kulick, Michael Egner. Implications of modern decision science for military decision-support systems. Santa Monica: Rand, 2005.

Davis, Jacquelyn K. CVX : A Smart Carrier For The New Era. Washington : Brassey's, 1998.


Drew, Dennis M. And Donald M. Snow. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy/An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2006.

Drinkwine, Brian M. The Serpent In Our Garden : Al-Qa'ida And The Long War./ Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009.

Edwards, Sean J. A. Swarming and the Future of Warfare. Santa Monica: Rand, 2005.

Eland, Ivan. Putting "Defense" Back into the U. S. Defense Policy : Rethinking U. S. Security in the Post-Cold War World . Westport: Greenwood, 2001.

Evans, Michael. The Tyranny Of Dissonance : Australia's Strategic Culture And Way Of War, 1901-2005. Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005.

Fishel, John T. and Max G. Manwaring. Uncomfortable Wars Revisited. Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.

Frank, Aaron. B. Pre-Conflict Management Tools: Winning the Peace. Washington: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, February 2005, 37 pages.

Freedman, Lawrence. The Transformation Of Strategic Affairs. New York : Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.

Gompert, David C., Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins. Battle-Wise Gaining Advantage in Networked Warfare. Washington: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, January 2005.
Gray, Colin S. War, Peace And International Relations : An Introduction To Strategic History. London: Routledge, 2007.

Haass, Richard N. Intervention : The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998.

Hanley, Brian. Planning for Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Westport: Praeger, 2008.

Hart, Gary. Fourth Power : A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century. London: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Hattiangadi, Anita U. The Third Annual navy workforce Research and Analysis Conference: Supporting Military Transformation CRM D 0008431.A2/Final, Washington: CAN, June 2003, 38 pages.

Heng, Yee-Kuang. War As Risk Management : Strategy And Conflict In An Age Of Globalised Risks. New York : Routledge, 2006.

Hicks, Kathleen and Eric Ridge. Planning for Stability Operations/The Use of Capabilities-Based Approaches. Washington: CSIS Report, 2007.

Hoehn, Andy. N3w Division of Labor : Reconsidering American Strategy and Forces to Meet New Challenges. Santa Monica: Rand, 2007.

Joint Staff, Joint training manual for the Armed Forces of the Unites States CJCSM 3500.03A, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2002.

Keller, William W. and Gordon R. Mitchell. Hitting First : Preventive Force In U.S. Security Strategy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006.

Kinross, Stuart. Clausewitz And America : Strategic Thought And Practice From Vietnam To Iraq. London : Routledge, 2008.

Kiras, James D. Special Operations And Strategy : From World War II To The War On Terrorism. New York : Routledge, 2006.

Klein, Gary. Intuition at Work: Why Developing Your Gut Instincts Will Make You Better at What You Do. New York: Random House, 2003.

Kreighbaum, Jay M. Force-Application Planning / A Systems-and-Effects-Based Approach. Maxwell Airforce Base: Air University Press, 2004.

Lewis, Harmon S. Breaking the Code for Operational Planners: A Comparative Analysis of National Security Strategies Since the End of the Cold War. Norfolk: Joint Advanced Warfighting, 2008.

Lewis, Leslie, James A Coggin, and C. Robert Roll. The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process/An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework. MR 445 A/SOCOM. Rand: Arroyo Center, National Defense Research Institute, 1994.

Lingel, Sherrill Lee. Methodology For Improving The Planning, Execution, And Assessment Of Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance. Santa Monica: RAND, 2007.

Lind, Michael. American Way of Strategy. London: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Loveman, Brian. Strategy For Empire : U.S. Regional Security Policy In The Post-Cold War Era. by Lanham: SR Books, 2004.

Mahnken, Thomas G., and Thomas A. Keaney. War in Iraq : planning and execution. New York : Routledge, 2007.

Mandel, Robert. Security, Strategy, And The Quest For Bloodless War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

Meinhart, Richard, “Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 to 2005,” Letort Papers April 2006, 29 pages.

Metz, Steven. Iraq & The Evolution Of American Strategy. Washington: Potomac Books, 2008.

Miller, Steven E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Michael E. Brown. America's Strategic Choices. Boston: MIT Press, 2000.

Murdock, Clark A. Improving The Practice Of National Security Strategy : A New Approach For The Post-Cold War World. Washington: CSIS Press, 2004.

Ochmanek, David A. Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad : Implications For The United States Air Force. Santa Monica: RAND, 2003.

O'Hanlon, Michael E. Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.

Owens, John E., and John W. Dumbrell. America's "War On Terrorism" : New Dimensions In U.S. Government And National Security. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008.

Partin, John W. and Rob Rhoden, Operation Assured Response: SOCEUR’s Neo in Liberia April 1996, United States Special Operations Command History and Research Office, September 1997, 50 pages

Pirnie, Bruce. Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids / Recommendations. Rand: Santa Monica, 1994.

Renshon, Jonathan. Why Leaders Choose War : The Psychology Of Prevention. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Reveron, Derek S. and Judith Hicks. Inside Defense : Understanding The U.S. Military In The 21st Century. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Riedel, Bruce. The Search for Al Qaeda/ Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future Washington: Brookings, 2009.

Rudd, David, Deborah Bayley, Ewa K. Petruczynik. Beyond The Three-Block War. Toronto : Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2006.

Sloan, Elinor C. Military Transformation And Modern Warfare : A Reference Handbook. Westport: Praeger, 2008.

Tucker, David. Confronting The Unconventional : Innovation And Transformation In Military Affairs. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006.

US Government. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Washington: Office of the President of the United States, September 2006, 29 pages.

United States Transportation Command, Joint Deployment System (JDS) Procedures Manual, 22 February 1988, 40 pages.

Yarger, Harry R. Strategy And The National Security Professional : Strategic Thinking And Strategy Formulation In The 21st Century. Westport: Praeger, 2008.

Bronte, Shaftesbury, Palat, Phelizon, Collingham, Wolin

I read Anne Bronte's Tenant of Windfell Hall, and what I liked about it was the subject matter, the story of a woman's marriage made intolerable by the husband's control and alcoholism. It struck me as very contemporary. I also read a biography of the 7th Earl of Shaftesbury, a great humanitarian who introduced legislation to reform the conditions for chimney sweeps, coal mining women and children, and the mentally ill. It was moving and inspiring, although he seems to have been unhappy himself. I also read Palat's book on Clausewitz, dating from 1919. I've read many books like this one, discussing the great strategist and the great strategies, but as usual for authors in this period, their thinking strikes me now as limited. I read with great pleasure Phelizon's Action strategique. This book was excellent, and there are a number of similarities in the theory. I don't agree on every point, but that takes nothing away from the value of the work. I'm quite excited to find such similarities at last, after 20 years of research by my self. I also read Elizabeth Collingham's Curry, a history of food in India. It was very interesting, and was full of information I didn't know. For example, tea came from China with the British to India, and it took some time for the Indians to cotton on. Most Indian restaurants are held by Syhlets, formerly river boatmen who were put out of work by the steamboats the British introduced to India. Finally I read Richard Wolin's Heidegger Controversy, which was really germane to an article I'm writing. The problem is that he takes for granted something I am arguing in my present draft. I look forward to taking up the cudgel again.

In Pursuit of Military Excellence and other readings

Since my last post, I've read two issues of The New Yorker, two issues of The New Scientist, Vogue's spring issue, several works of Pascal, and Shimon Naveh's Pursuit of Military Excellence. This last book was published in 1997, and it looks at the operational art. The problem with it, I think, is that he never moves beyond the idea of national schools of strategy into the more theoretical realm, although he may do that in another book. It otherwise treads on some of the same material that I have written about. It is incredibly generously footnoted, and for the first time in my career he refers to works in strategy that I haven't read. I will be returning to Pascal shortly. I am considering starting to read a lot more in French for the next while.

last Popper book, Alan Greenspan's memoir, half a dozen military books

Karl Popper's last book is a collection of short pieces published in German now translated. There is nothing here that is particularly new, but I ploughed through it so I could say I've read his complete works. I also read Alan Greenspan's memoir. The first 250 pages whizzed by, but when he started in on his long list of opinions on matters economic, apart from China, I was bored. He doesn't even discuss deciding to retire and his comments on the Bush admin are very limited, for all the press they got. I also read the complete works of Saint John Perse. I don't usually read poetry, but this time it was an exception -- he certainly was a learned poet, I couldn't figure half his vocabulary. Also, he writes either in paragraphs or in really long verses. I didn't get why he was so important, but then I hit a few more simple poems, and the power of his voice hit me over the head.

For professional reasons, I read Strategic Theory for the 21st Century, by Harry R. Yargar, along with several other monographs. These are in preparation for writing my own next monograph.

Gene Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action

This is an excellent three-volume description of the use of nonviolent means in a confrontation between a dissident group and a state government, or state organization. I was interested in reading this book because it interests some potential collaborators of mine, and I’m very glad I did. First, it’s the closest thing I’ve read in a long time to the sort of work I do, and the sort of book I write, although frankly, this is much more detailed and comprehensive. Second, it made me think about what my own work is and is not – this is a philosophical read of the book in the manner of Berdiaev, but it is very useful to me. It’s on this last point that I would like to elaborate.

First, Sharp does not distinguish between psychological violence and physical violence, and I do. Mind you, this was written in 1968 or so, when no one was yet thinking about psychological violence except in the most unsubtle terms.

Second, the methods he recommends are limited to uses between a dissident group and a government. My work on strategy applies to the full spectrum of possible interactions between actors: person to phenomenon or event, person to person, person to group, person to international group, person to government, person to group of governments, group to phenomenon or event, group to group, group to international group, group to government, group to group of governments, international group to government, international group to international group, international group to group of governments, international group to phenomenon, government to phenomenon, government to government, government to group of governments, group of governments to group of governments.

Third, the politics of nonviolent action only really apply to a conflict or a confrontation. Strategy is applicable to conflict or confrontation as well as exploiting opportunities or making the best of a situation.

Fourth, to work, the politics of nonviolent action require the confronted government to have an audience about whose opinion it cares – in other words, there has to be the potential for that government to be embarrassed. It doesn’t work in the case of, say Communist China under Mao and Tibet, because Communist China didn’t care what the West thought of it.

Fifth, to work, the politics of nonviolent action requires there to be some value placed on the dissident group. Again, with China and its periodic target of certain types of crimes or criminals, the government places no value and does not care if it executes a hundred of them within a few days of arrest, because its values are on preventing a certain type of crime, as happened with embezzlement a few years ago.

Sixth, my work is about strategy, and Sharp’s work really is about tactics and counter tactics. This means that my work would complement Sharp’s to the extent that it would explore and train in detail how to use those tactics.

Seventh, my work is at a higher level of generality, hence the comments about greater than confrontation, greater than nonviolent means, etc. But strategy can make nonviolence better, in terms of understanding the power that is to be confronted, and underdog strategy can make nonviolent action even better too.

Eighth, strategy does not require success to be an equalization of power. Strategy can help assure survival.

Ninth, underdog strategy assumes a constant state of unequal power throughout the period covered by the strategy.

Tenth, strategy can be used by the powerful as well as the underdog. Fortunately, powerful people, groups or governments usually practice strategy of the strong, and they are usually bad at it.

Eleventh, nonviolent action requires the participation and long-term mobilization of a significant proportion of people. That doesn’t happen very often, it’s a tall order, and if a regime is long-lived enough or brutal enough, it can literally beat the life out of the people it is oppressing.

Twelfth, Sharp will work with liberal democratic countries and authoritarian regimes, but not the totalitarian ones unless they are already weakened for other reasons.